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The WTO Practice of Legality is Ensuring Transparency for Self-Enforcing Trade 
 
Abdulmalik M. Altamimi 
 
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy (2018) Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 132-155 
Abstract 
This article reviews the World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance procedures, 
by invoking the interactional international law concept of a community of legal 
practice. One of the core objectives of the WTO is to maintain a practice of legality, 
including guaranteeing state and non-state actors interact based on world trade 
norms. In seeking to achieve this objective, the WTO aims to uphold the trade rule 
of law by emphasizing compliance with specified rules and procedures during the 
accession process, dispute settlement, and trade policy review. When examining 
these procedures in depth, evidence emerges of a strong link between transparency 
and enforcement in WTO law. This article investigates these three procedures for 
effecting compliance, to assess whether the WTO is sustaining a practice of 
legality. Second, it briefly illuminates Chad Bown’s proposal to establish an 
Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments to improve member states’ remit to 
detect, challenge, and deter noncompliance.  
 
Keywords: Interactional International Law; WTO Accession; WTO Dispute Settlement; 
WTO Trade Policy Review; Transparency.  
1.  Introduction: 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was founded to uphold and maintain a practice of 
legality aligned with the purpose of world trade norms for reciprocal and non-discriminatory 
interaction. The WTO was principally influenced by the laws and practices set out in the 1948 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In particular, the GATT principle of non-
discrimination was considered the most important general principle of the trade rule of law, 
and it sustained legal practice under multilateral trade agreements.
1
 Nonetheless, legal practice 
under WTO law cannot be fully deconstructed without invoking the interactional theory of 
international law (hereinafter interactionalism), which underpins the formation, interpretation, 
and implementation of the law. The three elements of interactionalism are best understood as 
a circular model of law-making, which starts with ‘shared legal and political understandings’ 
that correspond with Lon Fuller’s ‘eight constitutive principles of legality’; these then become 
enmeshed in a ‘practice of legality’ that revolves around the ideal of ‘fidelity to law’.
2
  
                                             
1
 Wilfred Ethier, ‘Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World’ (2004) Review of 
International Economics 303. 
2
 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 123 (hereinafter An Interactional Account). 
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According to Fuller, to encourage fidelity, a social norm must satisfy the following eight 
principles of legality: generality, promulgation, prospectivity, clarity, non-contradictory, not 
asking the impossible, constancy, and congruence between official action and the law.
3
 If these 
principles are substantially met by law-makers, any interaction between parties will be legal.
4
 
The eighth principle, of congruence between official actions and declared rules, is the most 
salient to achieve legality, as its primary focus is on legal practices that conform with the 
intended purpose and process of law. Interactionalism assumes that transparency and 
enforcement are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The following application of 
interactionalism, using the element of ‘practice of legality’, will demonstrate its suitability for 
illuminating the often-distorted notion of legal obligation under WTO law. The primary task 
of the WTO is to improve the transparency of trade-related practices, with the primary intent 
of effectively enforcing the law. The future of the WTO is thus intrinsically linked to sustaining 
ongoing practices of legality that correspond with international trade norms. To this end, the 
efficacy of WTO law depends not only on its role in adjudication, but also on facilitating 
interactional legal practices. 
 
To fully address the practice of legality under the WTO, this article will first, provide a brief 
overview of the concept of a community of legal practice in interactionalism, and second, 
examine, in light of the interactional approach, those WTO procedures that are primarily 
concerned with building and sustaining compliance, namely, the accession process, dispute 
settlement system, and Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Third, it will consider Chad 
Bown’s original proposal for establishing the Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments 
(IAWC) as a forum for fostering a continuous practice of legality.
5 
The reasons and objectives 
for establishing the IAWC, which include facilitating legal interactions between member states 
to ensure compliance with WTO commitments, will be explicated. 
 
 
 
                                             
3
 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edn. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) 39. 
4
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5
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2.  The Community of Legal Practice in Interactional International Law Theory  
State practice plays a key role in agreements to adopt customary international law, and the 
interpretation and amendment of treaties. The notion of ‘a community of practice’ implies that 
institutional rules, and the behaviour of states within an international institutional framework, 
are largely formed through discourse.
6
 However, interactionalism maintains that the practice 
of legality in this community of state practice is founded on the ideal of ‘fidelity to law’, which 
all legal orders were founded in order to uphold.
7
 Legal norms are derived from the shared 
commitments of actors, and must comply with the Fullerian principles of legality in order to 
inspire fidelity.
8
According to Brunnée and Toope, ‘fidelity is generated, and in our terminology 
obligation is felt, because adherence to the eight criteria of legality (a ‘practice of legality’) 
produces law that is legitimate in the eyes of the persons to whom it is addressed’.
9
 However, 
for law to exert such a distinctive influence, it is essential ‘to cultivate spaces and opportunities 
for engagement with and around legal norms’.
10
 Interactionalism focuses on legal practices 
designed to appreciate the roles and limitations of the sources and enforcement mechanisms of 
international law, and to demonstrate how best to cultivate constructive interactions related to 
the idea of law.
11
   
Brunnée and Toope further argue the ‘law is not a fixed artifact, a product to be consumed by 
actors in a system. It is a mutually constituting process of interaction involving a diversity of 
actors and structures in overlapping communities of legal practice’.
12
 Moreover, law should be 
practised to allow political expressions and actions to be pursued within open, interactive legal 
channels.
13
 According to Fuller, one of the primary aims of law is to ‘open up, maintain, and 
preserve the integrity of the channels’ through which actors can communicate ‘across the 
boundaries and through the barriers that separate’ them.
14
 
                                             
6
 Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International 
Relations (Routledge 2005) 15. 
7
 Brunnée and Toope, An Interactional Account (n 2) 44-45. 
8
 ibid 27. 
9
 ibid. 
10
 ibid 100. 
11
 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Interactional International Law and the Practice of Legality’ in Emanuel 
Adler and Vicent Pouliot (eds), International Practices (Cambridge University Press 2011) 110 (hereinafter The 
Practice of Legality). See Lon Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’ (1969) The American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 1.  
12
 Brunnée and Toope, ‘The Practice of Legality’ (n 11) 116. 
13
 Brunnée and Toope, An Interactional Account (n 2) 72. 
14
 Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 3) 186.  
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Brunnée and Toope also maintain that, ‘it is the fulfilment of [the principles of legality], 
supported by a continuous practice of legality, that amount to what Adler and Pouliot call 
“competent performances” of the practice of international law’.
15
 According to Adler and 
Pouliot, ‘practices are competent performances (…) socially meaningful patterns of action 
which (…) simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and 
discourse in and on the material world’.
16
  
As alluded to above, the eighth principle of legality, the congruence between official actions 
and declared rules, is the most salient to achieving a practice of legality. Without the principle 
of congruence, the central aim of law to provide stability and predictability in the community 
of law-subjects, will be impossible to achieve. Such an effect would also be the result of 
violating other principles of legality, however, it is the violation of principles of law not 
demanding the impossible, and being congruent with official action, which would have the 
most destructive effect on the reciprocal relationship between law-maker and law-subject.
17
 On 
this point, Brunnée and Toope maintain that the principle of congruence,  
[I]s where the need for analysis of practice becomes most apparent (…) congruence 
is nothing other than a continuous practice of legality that upholds the other criteria 
of legality (…) the criteria of legality are crucial in shaping the patterns of a practice 
of legality. If a practice consists of a “socially meaningful pattern of action,” the 
criteria of legality provide the meaningful content of legal interaction; they allow 
for interpretation along similar standards (…) Interactional obligation must be 
[practised] to maintain its influence. Because obligation depends in large part upon 
the reciprocity or mutuality of expectations among participants in a legal system- 
a reciprocity that is collectively built and maintained- it exists only when a society’s 
legal practices are “congruent” with existing norms and the requirements of 
legality.
18
  
 
Observance of the principles of legality will have the effect of sustaining legality over time. 
Legal practices are often shaped by shared commitments to legal norms regarding association 
and interaction. For example, the elementary relationship between law and economics based 
                                             
15
 Brunnée and Toope, ‘The Practice of Legality’ (n 11) 108. 
16
 Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices: Introduction and Framework’ in Adler and Pouliot (eds), 
International Practices (n 11) 6. 
17
 This is derived from Fuller’s references that violating these principles, in particular, will lead to a revolution. 
Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 3) 36-38. 
18
 Brunnée and Toope, ‘The Practice of Legality’ (n 11) 114, 116-117 (emphasis added) citing Gerald Postema, 
‘Implicit Law’ in Willem Witteveen and Wibern van der Burg, Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law 
and Institutional Design (Amsterdam University Press 1999), and Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices: 
Introduction and Framework’ in Adler and Pouliot (eds), International Practices (n 11) 6 (emphasis added). 
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on ‘the legal guarantee’, which gives a higher degree of certainty to traders who contract, and 
accordingly interact, legally with each other.
19
  
The standard view of the association between law and economics in the context of the world 
trading system maintains that at the national level ‘law makes the economy’,
20
 while at the 
international level ‘international law has always had considerable ‘economic content’’.
21
 The 
evolution from the dominance of power-politics to respecting the international trade rule of law 
was safeguarded by the cultivation of shared commitments on compliance with world trade 
principles, particularly reciprocity and non-discrimination (GATT Articles (XXVIII bis), (I) 
and (III)). Reciprocal and non-discriminatory interactions between consenting states have 
sustained the multilateral trading system since the creation of the GATT in 1948. For the WTO, 
and for the GATT during its early years of structuring, ‘reciprocity and non-discrimination 
have been both the ends and the means (…) they have been its purpose as well as its process’.
22
 
According to Wolfe, 
The trade regime is not the WTO treaty or decisions of the Appellate Body, it is 
the way in which traders think about reciprocity and non-discrimination in global 
trade (…) the WTO is a site for the elaboration of a system of ‘law’ that arises from 
and provides a framework for self-directed human interaction.
23
  
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the WTO has been largely sustained by the facilitation of 
interactive means to support regular meetings and discussions, argumentation and compromise, 
to create binding agreements and standards supported by all member states.
24
  
For example, after examining the development of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS) through member states’ continual interactions, within which standards 
were set and even disputes were settled amicably, Wolfe said: 
                                             
19
 Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein (trans), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (3rd printing, Harvard 
University Press 1969) 98-99. 
20
 Philip Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
86. 
21
 John Jackson, ‘International Economic Law: Complexity and Puzzles’, (2007) Journal of International 
Economic Law 3.  
22
 Robert Wolfe, ‘Kaleidoscopic Multilateralism: Lon Fuller, Rod Macdonald and the WTO’ Richard Janda and 
others (eds), The Unbounded Level of the Mind: Rob Macdonald’s Legal Imagination (McGill-Queen’s 
University Press 2015) 88. 
23
 Robert Wolfe, ‘See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System’ (2005) European 
Journal of International Relations 339.  
24
 Sungjoon Cho, ‘How the World Trade Community Operates: Norms and Discourse’ (2014) World Trade 
Review 685. 
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The simple existence of courts (like the WTO dispute settlement) does not prove 
that the or a rule of law exists. Actors, including states officials, can be governed 
by law without needing courts. To speak of the role of adjudication in the 
‘enforcement’ of ‘binding’ rules obscures what the WTO actually does in helping 
to provide transparency, consensual knowledge, and legitimation for the regime.
25
  
The deeply interactional underpinnings of international trade law highlight the importance of 
transparency to both the purpose and processes of WTO law, especially the accession process, 
committee system, and trade policy review.
26
 These three vital and continuous processes exceed 
the role of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in affecting compliance, because of their 
multifaceted enforcement roles. As a general rule, any analysis of compliance must consider 
the enforcement process, or, in the WTO context, processes, as enforcement is ‘the action or 
process of enforcing’ compliance, whereas compliance is ‘the action, practice, or fact of 
complying’.
27
  
Moreover, the WTO as an institutional setting for rule-making and administration must achieve 
two important aims in order to realise the benefits of free trade. First, it guides ‘the reciprocal 
bargaining’ process by establishing a level playing field as a policy goal for competing trade 
interests.
28
 Second, it corrects the market distortions created by the disruption to foreign market 
access via the WTO DSB’s binding decisions on the status of the respondent state’s distorting 
measure, and, if needed, recommending an accordant adjustment to this measure.
29
 These 
essentially administrative functions of the WTO raise three interrelated points of inquiry 
concerning: a) the role of the WTO accession process in building the foundations of compliance 
with WTO law; b) the instrumentality of the DSB in the efficacy of WTO law; and, c) the 
enforcement role of the TPRM.   
 
 
                                             
25
 Wolfe, (n 23); Gregory Shaffer and others, ‘Can Informal Law Discipline Subsidies?’ (2015) Journal of 
International Economic Law 711; Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott, ‘The Hidden World of WTO Governance’ 
(2009) European Journal of International Law 575. 
26
 See Petros Mavroidis and Robert Wolfe, ‘From Sunshine to a Common Agent: The Evolving Understanding 
of Transparency in the WTO’ (2015) RSCAS Policy Papers 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34860/RSCAS_PP_2015_01.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 23 
December 2015. 
27
 See Enforcement and Compliance Entries, Oxford English Dictionary 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/62166?redirectedFrom=enforcement#eid> accessed 27 December 2016.  
28
 John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (2nd edn, 
MIT Press) 19-21, Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today (Princeton University Press) 95-120 
29
 ibid. 
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3.  An Interactional World Trade Law from the Point of Accession 
The most appropriate conception of an international law is to view it as conveying and creating 
information, and facilitating credible commitments.
30
 The point of accepting the bindings of 
the law is merely the beginning of an interactional process that involves using the law as 
medium for communication, shaping behaviour, and sanctioning deviation. This is true of the 
purposes of national as well as international law-making, such as WTO law, where ‘a 
community of law’ has been formed to ensure conformity with legal practices.
31
 The process 
of acceding to the WTO is legally critical because of the role of agency in facilitating the 
acceding states’ acceptance of world trade law and its coming into force. Once a state becomes 
a WTO member it must participate in a number of processes and activities for making and 
maintaining WTO law, primarily for the purpose of ensuring its own compliance. This critical 
role of participation sheds light on the nature of the evolving WTO legal arrangements.  
From the outset, ‘legalisation’ has been the primary attraction of the world trading system; for 
example, developing and least-developing members were drawn to the system because of their 
belief in its legalistic structure for providing fair and equal interaction.
32 
The key point of 
accepting and forming substantive understanding of WTO law is during the accession 
negotiations. These negotiations of accession commitments have important implications in 
helping acceding states ensure their trade policies and practices are compliant with WTO law. 
Thus, this first point of entry into law, the accession to the rule-based multilateral trading 
system, is worthy of critical legal analysis. During the GATT era, accession was openly 
fraught, characterised by political calculations rather than legal considerations with regard to  
making credible commitments to the GATT community.
33
  
The WTO, however, provides a contractual condition upon the states acceding to become WTO 
members. According to the brief WTO Article (XII:1) on Accession, ‘any states or separate 
custom territory (…) may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the 
WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement, and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
                                             
30
 See Beth Simmons, ‘Treaty Compliance and Violation’ (2010) Annual Review of Political Science 273.  
31
 See Sungjoon Cho, The Social Foundations of World Trade: Norms, Community, and Constitution 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 25. 
32
 See Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization 
2013) 201. 
33
 For example, it was because of the influence of France, rather than political or legal sovereignty, that Lebanon 
and Syria were among the original (23) founding parties of the GATT. Similarly, Japan accession to GATT was 
‘pushed through’ by the US, as it feared that if Japan did not become a contracting party it would join the rival 
‘communist club’ of countries. See Lisa Toohey, ‘Accession as a Dialogue: Epistemic Communities and the 
World Trade Organization’ (2014) Leiden Journal of International Law 397. 
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annexed thereto’.
34
 These annexed Agreements include the GATT and the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), and they are ‘binding on all Members’ (WTO Agreement Article 
(II:2).
35
 However, Article (XII) is brief and poorly defines the standard required for accession, 
which raises the point that it might have been intentionally drafted as such in order to highlight 
the role of WTO and non-WTO agencies in making the accession process possible, and within 
the WTO legal boundaries.
36
 However, the accession process under the WTO is characterised 
by political rather than legal considerations in regard to compliance purposes.  
According to Toohey, WTO accession is under-theorised, especially when viewed as a process 
of cataloguing in the accession protocols, provisions that have no clear basis in WTO 
agreements (i.e. WTO-plus), or fall short of these agreements (i.e. WTO-minus, e.g. preclusion 
of the provision on special and differentiated treatment (SDT)).
37
 However, Toohey has 
attempted to address this issue in order ‘to explain the important, but generally overlooked, 
role of epistemic communities in creating and perpetuating discourse about the appropriate 
terms of accession’.
38
 However, Toohey’s attempt to single out the role of an epistemic 
community of experts who performed a constructive role in helping acceding states was 
burdened by various difficulties, primarily because of the political rather than legalistic nature 
of the accession discourse, and its negative influence on compliance. Toohey explained this 
issue by using the example of Vietnam’s accession, which was heavily influenced by technical 
assistance provided by industry groups, and the United States (US) and European consulting 
companies, who made up the accession ‘project’. Toohey explained that the project was,  
financed by a government [the Vietnamese] that, within the accession negotiations, 
is pushing for the broadest market commitments possible and the greatest extent of 
liberalization, regardless of whether those commitments are contained in the WTO 
Agreements or are WTO plus (…) the information provided by industry groups 
such as the US-Vietnam Chamber of Commerce to the US Government during the 
negotiations (…) reflects an interest in maximally protecting their interests in the 
country, rather than any concern of an inconsistency with the WTO Agreements as 
such.
39
  
                                             
34
 World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (20th printing, Cambridge University Press 2013) 12 (hereinafter, The WTO Legal Texts).  
35
 ibid 302. 
36
 Toohey (n 33). 
37
 ibid. 
38
 ibid citing Peter Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 
International Organization 1. 
39
 ibid citing (United Nations Economic and Social Council Secretariat, Mainstreaming the Right to 
Development into International Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade Organization, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17, at 11, 9 June 2004). 
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As the Vietnamese example shows, Toohey was right to conclude that ‘WTO accession 
remains the subject of power politics rather than subject to the rule of law, and perhaps more 
acutely so than other aspects of the WTO activity’.
40
 Toohey’s article provides a balanced and 
rich analysis of a key point of legal interaction, and highlights the detrimental impact of the 
defects in the WTO accession process on the practice of legality. To a limited extent, the WTO 
Secretariat appears to be the only accession actor performing a constructive legal role by 
ensuring compliance with the trade rule of law through upholding principles of promulgation 
and clarity of legal commitments made by the acceding state.
41
 Independent technical assistance 
can perform the task of assuring conformity with WTO law, but it is not as effective as the role 
of the Secretariat, and does not have dedicated and sufficient legal expertise to perform this 
task.
42
  
The WTO accession process must consider the role of shared political and legal understandings 
of compliance in regard to the three sub-elements of ‘norm-cycle, an epistemic community, 
and a community of practice’.
43
 Contrary to the view that the WTO accession process should 
be solely dependent on the work of ‘epistemic communities’, and end when the state becomes 
a member, the process must be continuously refined in the WTO community of legal practice. 
The existing WTO accession process fails relative to the measure of being effectively 
conducted within a clearly defined legal limits and forms. Despite the inclusion in the report 
by the working parties on accession of the acceding state’s ‘framework for making and 
enforcing policies’, it remains questionable whether this is a mere formality, or intended to 
show credible, enforceable commitments to facilitating compliance with WTO obligations.
44
 
Because of the lack of promulgation during the accession process, the WTO function of 
adjudication will come into conflict with the practice of legality, causing a member state that 
has not made enforceable promises, to deviate from (i.e. breach) the GATT/WTO rules. A high-
profile case that illustrates the limits of the WTO accession procedure is China’s membership.  
                                             
40
 Toohey (n 33). 
41
 ibid. 
42
 ibid. 
43
 Brunnée and Toope, An Interactional Account (n 2) 56-65. 
44
 Protocols of Accession for New Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods and Services 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm#sau> accessed 10 of March 2016. 
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Despite being the only country ‘whose accession agreement required policymakers to improve 
the rule of law’,
45
 China arguably made the most disputed commitments found in any accession 
protocol of a WTO member. Of the (35) recorded WTO disputes concerning protocol of 
accession, (25) complaints were brought against China; this is a clear indication that China is 
failing to keep its promises.
46
 For example, complainants cited different paragraphs of China’s 
accession protocol and the Working Party Report on the Accession of China, which detail 
China’s assurances that it would fully comply with WTO law.
47
 In most of these cases the panel 
and Appellate Body (AB) agree with the complainants; for instance, in two cases brought by 
the US and Canada against China’s measures affecting imports of automobile parts, the panel 
concluded that China acted inconsistently with its commitments under its protocol of accession 
and the Working Party Report.
48
 
The majority of the complainants in disputes involving China’s accession protocol were made 
by developed members, but developing members have also complained about the lack of 
conformity between China’s accession commitments, its trade conduct, and the status of its 
accession protocol. Although accession protocols have a legal status, as, once concluded, they 
become ‘an integral part of the WTO Agreement’, their interpretation has proven problematic.
49
 
This is largely because of misinterpretation by a member state of the accession protocol status 
and entitlements, as in the case of China, and the lack of transparency during the accession 
process.
50
 The AB bears some responsibility for misinterpretation, as it has twice erroneously 
separated the protocol of accession from the WTO Agreement.
51
 When accession is not based 
                                             
45
 Susan Aaronson and M. Abouharb, ‘Does the WTO Help Member States Improve Governance?’ (2013) 
World Trade Review 1. 
46
 Disputes by Agreement 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A30> accessed 9 of March 
2016. 
47
 See DS508: China-Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials; DS340: China-Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts; DS517: China: Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products.  
48
 Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, pages 357-359, WT/DS340/R, adopted 
18 July 2008.  
49
Jingdong Liu, ‘Accession Protocols: Legal Status in the WTO Legal System’ (2014) Journal of World Trade 
751. 
50
 Qingjiang Kong, China and the World Trade Organization: A Legal Perspective (World Scientific 2002) 92, 
109-112. See Andrew Mitchell and Joanne Wallis, ‘Pacific Countries in the WTO: Accession and 
Accommodation, the Reality of WTO Accession’ in Yong-Shik Lee and others (eds), Law and Development 
Perspective on International Trade Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 179-222. 
51
 Matthew Kennedy, ‘The Integration of Accession Protocols into the WTO Agreement’ (2013) Journal of 
World Trade 45, citing Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, para. 363, WT/DS394/AB/R, adopted 30 January 2012; Appellate Body Report, China-Measures 
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publication and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, para. 417, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 December 2009. 
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on credible legal commitments, the state’s practice, will be negatively affected, as well as the 
WTO’s ability to administer trade relations. China was challenged on its accession protocol on 
the basis of its contested WTO classification as a developing member despite its increasing 
economic power.
52
  
However, the same issues relating to the accession of China could arise with any WTO member 
once it flexes its economic muscles and takes a deviant path of noncompliance. This risk is real 
because, from the outset, WTO accession has been largely founded on flexible political rather 
than strict clear legal constraints. Thus, the following three interactionalism-based suggestions 
should be considered for reforming the WTO accession process:  
1. The Working Party on Accession should facilitate a legalistic discourse based on building 
shared understandings of the legal nature of GATT/WTO rules, and inspect member states’ 
trade policies and practices in order to authenticate accession documents. The Working 
Party report should focus on the acceding member’s efforts to develop a culture of 
transparency and accountability for implementing accession commitments. The report, 
‘needs to emphasize that conformity with the trading rules is an essential element of a 
market-oriented development strategy, and this is the key to accession to the WTO’.
53
  
2. The WTO must establish ‘a community of legal practice’ for accession purposes to provide 
acceding states with technical assistance and legal expertise. Instead of relying on the 
conditional help of developed member states, acceding states should be independent in 
seeking assistance for accession purposes. The WTO Secretariat should provide effective 
legal aid to working parties and acceding states to assure their observance of rule of law 
principles. The trade rule of law, which involves consideration of principles such as non-
discrimination, should be enshrined in the working parties’ draft reports and member states’ 
accession protocols. Every WTO accession process, not only that of China, should require 
policymakers to improve the rule of law. 
3. Accession defects should be subject to legal scrutiny by the WTO Trade Policy Review 
Body (TPRB). The TPRB is an ideal setting for remedying accession defects and 
maintaining a practice of legality. For example, the TPRB can complement the WTO 
accession process by reviewing the trade policies and practices of newly acceding or 
                                             
52
 Russia too has the same contested developing country status that entitled it to special and differentiated 
treatment exemptions, see Sonia Rolland, Development at the WTO (Oxford University Press 2012) 84. 
53
 Murray Smith ‘Accession to the WTO: Key Strategic Issues’ in Jeffrey Schott (ed), The World Trading 
System: Challenges Ahead (Peterson Institute 1996) 180. 
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offending members states in order to ensure transparency and compliance with 
GATT/WTO rules. The TPRB should be permitted to review accession documents and 
implementation plans to ensure observance of the trade rule of law for a fairer multilateral 
trading system. 
In brief, the defects in the WTO accession process cannot be remedied by the DSB. The high-
profile cases concerning accession highlight a concern regarding the role of legal practice in 
the WTO, especially the congruence between official action and the law. If the acceding states 
are at liberty to circumvent the principles of legality, especially those of promulgation and 
clarity, during the accession process, then they will feel at liberty to evade the law once they 
become WTO members, and, even where the DSB is notified of a breach, it will be unable to 
correct this misconduct. The following section will elaborate further on the DSB’s role in 
upholding WTO obligations. 
 
4.  The WTO DSB and the Congruence Between Official Action and the Law: 
The DSB is a key component of the analysis of legal rules and practices in the world trading 
system. However, according to interactionalism, an enforcement mechanism such as the DSB 
is only one element of the interactional law process.
54
 The focus on the work of the DSB in 
terms of its ‘limited’ role in promoting and complying with the congruence principle does not 
overlook the importance of interactional legal practice. In order to inspire fidelity, WTO law 
must continue to cultivate ‘shared understandings’, especially of the most disputed WTO rules, 
namely the GATT Articles (I) and (III) on the principle of non-discrimination.
55
 Moreover, 
these rules, in addition to DSB rulings and recommendations, must satisfy all of the principles 
of legality in order to inspire the intended effect, that of compliance. Once these rules are 
founded on substantive understandings and satisfy the principles of legality, they must then be 
performed within an interactive community of legal practice. In relation to the congruence 
principle and the DSB, the following issues will be discussed:  
1. Performing legality in the WTO is not the sole responsibility of the DSB, but 
of the organization as a whole.  
2. The lack of direct effect of WTO law has a negative effect on compliance. 
3. Legality is beyond the comprehension and reach of developing and least-
developing WTO member states.   
                                             
54
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These issues are pertinent to the DSB because they emanate from an inaccurate perception of 
WTO law, and the structural and textual defects of the DSB. According to legal positivism, 
international law is incorrectly perceived as deriving its legitimacy primarily from the authority 
of the court that interprets and applies the law. For example, the DSB has been hailed as a 
symbol of the success of the multilateral trading system.
56
 Although this might have been the 
case in the early years of the WTO, evidence from several studies shows that the DSB, in 
reality, has become the victim of its own success by creating two issues: institutional 
imbalance, and delayed settlement.
57
 According to Bossche and Zdouc, ‘this success has 
created an unwelcome institutional imbalance in the WTO between its ‘judicial’ branch and its 
political ‘rule-making’ branch’ which has forced the former to add new rules because of the 
weaknesses of the latter.
58
 In brief, the DSB has become ineffective precisely because of the 
WTO overreliance on its quasi-judicial branch. Moreover, contrary to the core mission of the 
DSB, almost all consultation and high profile disputes are not settled in a timely and effective 
manner; some have not been settled since the founding of the WTO in (1995).
59
 Litigated 
disputes suffer from misuses of the compliance review procedure under DSU Article (21.5) by 
the offending state, intended to prolong the dispute in order to reap the trade benefits resulting 
from delayed settlement.
60
  
 
The legality of the WTO must be built and cultivated in every space and opportunity for 
member states’ interactions, be those in the work of committees, general councils, or 
ministerial conferences, and these interactions must conform with the principles of legality. 
Socially constructed legal obligations, including those of the WTO, ‘cannot be reduced to the 
existence of fixed rules, [they are] made real in the continuing practice of communities that 
reason with and communicate through norms’.
61
 The emphasis on legalization and lack of legal 
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cooperation is worrisome for the critics of WTO legitimacy. For instance, Elsig stated about 
the WTO ‘in the past we might have overemphasized the study of the effects of legalizations 
to the detriment of focusing on the challenges posed by the distributional effect of 
cooperation’.
62
  
However, legalization based on the practice of legality cannot be separated from cooperation, 
as the former informs and refines cooperative practices. Hence, it is imperative to highlight the 
historical instances where practices of legality under world trade law have been successful. 
Two examples of successful interactions on the basis of legality stand out in the history of the 
world trading system. The first manifests in ‘the progressive legalization’ of the world trading 
regime during the GATT era, especially in the (1980s), when a community of practice was 
strengthened by a gradual increase in the number of legal practices involving participants from 
both developed and developing contracting parties.
63
 For example, those parties drew the 
following into the trading regime: most of the principles of legality, such as clarity, feasibility, 
and consistency; background knowledge on procedural rules and practices of the United 
Nations (UN) system, and on the design and implementation of other economic agreements.
64
 
Since the (1980), the submissions of contracting parties to the committees of specialized 
agreements of ‘Information on Implementation and Administration of the Agreement’ had 
promoted a practice of legality under the GATT.
65
  
It was primarily these GATT activities that had built a resilient community of legal practice 
that led to the progressive legalization of the world trading system.
66
 As a result, the GATT 
community had gradually matured into a community of law, making the organization ready to 
introduce legal bodies such as the GATT Office of Legal Affairs, and a panel dispute settlement 
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system.
67
 The GATT Office of Legal Affairs, which was established in (1982), played a crucial 
role in promoting legal practices by assisting the GATT panels with interpretation, and the 
Uruguay Round negotiators with the judicial design of the WTO.
68
 Although, these GATT 
initiatives did not stand the test of time, or resistance from developed contracting parties, as 
evidenced by the compliance deficit in the (1980s), they initiated and cultivated the practice of 
legality under the GATT, augmenting the legalistic nature of discourse.  
For example, the agreement to introduce a legalistic structure to the WTO was the result of an 
agreement made between Japan and the European Communities (EC) on the one hand, and the 
US on the other, with the former agreeing to be bound by a judicial system, in return for the 
latter foreswearing its unilateral actions.
69
 Even if this historical agreement had not been struck, 
the GATT community of legal practice would have continued to grow and ultimately force 
developed contracting parties into compliance, because of the external and internal strength it 
gained from engagement in, and cultivation of, a practice of legality. The contracting parties 
who later became members of the WTO had participated in a wider communities of 
international legal practice. Hence, the legalistic design of the WTO was not the result of fate, 
nor the willingness of the US Congress, but of a rich history of legal interactions between 
GATT contracting parties.  
Nevertheless, the practice of legality under the WTO has taken on a more developed and 
comprehensive form, as encapsulated in the five functions of the organization. These functions 
include ‘facilitating the implementation, administration, and operation, and further the 
objectives of’ the WTO establishing Agreement and the Multilateral Trading Agreements, 
through negotiations, effective administration, and cooperation with relevant international 
organizations.
70
 The WTO DSB, TPRM, Legal Affairs Division, various WTO committees, 
working parties, and working groups, are working to ensure effective and prompt observance 
of GATT/WTO rules. The second example of successful legal interactions in the history of 
world trade law is found in the work of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and 
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS) committees, where TPT/SPS rules are 
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(re)interpreted for consistency, and disputes are effectively settled without the help of the 
DSB.
71
  
Interactions in these committees have contributed significantly to the effective performance of 
their respective agreements. Mutual understandings of TPT/SPS rules have been arrived at and 
maintained through member states’ interactions on the basis of sound legality. In turn, this basis 
has been maintained by states ensuring, for example, that members’ rules concerning SPS are 
clear, promulgated, feasible, and mutually developed, to improve the safety of food supply.
72
 
The outcome of a disagreement between states, i.e. a dispute, which is usually settled early, is 
shared with other members for coherence and harmonization of standards.
73
 Such sharing of 
information is a more effective tool for learning than engaging in official disputes under the 
DSB, since information relating to most of these official disputes is often limited and difficult 
to comprehend, thus discouraging any observing states from learning about a particular field 
of trade.  
For example, there is very limited information available regarding the (178) current 
consultation disputes, and even once these disputes had been litigated, the effect of the 
participation of interested third parties is indeterminate.
74
 Although, in accordance with DSU 
Article (10) third parties can participate in official disputes by being afforded the right to be 
heard and make written submissions to the Panel, such participation has been found to ‘lower 
the prospect for early settlement and increase the likelihood that a case will go to a ruling, as 
opposed to be withdrawn’.
75
 Another current status of disputes that demonstrates the tendency 
toward long delays is (panel established, but not yet composed) with (28) disputes, some of 
them dating back to the (1990s).
76
 Overall, interacting in active committee settings such as the 
SPS/TPT is more beneficial for learning and effective in resolving disputes amicably than 
interacting via the DSB.   
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It is worth noting that the lack of information-sharing between member states in the committees 
on the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures makes the existing WTO notification schemes for state subsidies and anti-dumping 
duties ineffective.
77
 Without effective schemes, WTO member states cannot ensure consistency 
within, and optimal compliance with, the law, especially considering that the aforementioned 
agreements are the most disputed, after the GATT. It is a fact of social and legal practices that 
interactions on the basis of shared commitments are preferable to seeking the help of judges.
78
 
From the establishment and maintenance of ‘stable interactional expectancies’ originated 
effective bodies of customary and contract law, which play an integral role in human 
commercial life.
79
 The legality of the WTO should not only be assessed in reference to the 
institution’s edicts, or the DSB’s verdicts, but also by ‘sufficiently dense interactions’, and 
participation of the members of community of legal practice.
80
 
With regard to the lack of direct effect of WTO law, this particular issue has a detrimental 
impact on the WTO practice of legality.
81
 First, the terminology of direct effect needs to be 
clarified. According to Bossche and Zdouc:  
In many jurisdictions, the issue of direct effect, i.e. the issue of direct invocability, 
is to be distinguished from the issue of direct applicability, i.e. the issue whether a 
national act of transformation is necessary for an international agreement to 
become part of national law. On the latter issue, it should be noted that WTO law 
is directly applicable in the EU legal order. It became part of EU law without any 
act of transformation.
82
 
It can be argued that, in this sense, direct applicability is dependent on states providing direct 
invocability to WTO law provisions. However, the silence of the WTO on the issue of direct 
invocability has a negative impact on member states enforcement of WTO obligations, 
because, ‘if provisions of WTO law were to have direct effect and could be invoked to 
challenge the legality of national measures, this would significantly increase the enforceability 
and effectiveness of these provisions’.
83
 According to Herdegen, the ability of member states, 
especially the developed states, such as the US or those in the European Union (EU), to limit 
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the direct effect of WTO law, ‘seriously affects the pull to compliance with obligations under 
WTO law’.
84
 Herdegen explains the WTO law ‘direct effect conundrum’, below:   
Courts of WTO Members are willing to give effect to WTO law, if provisions of 
domestic law refer to WTO standards and if these provisions confer a specific right 
which individuals can invoke in judicial proceedings. Such provisions, which can 
be found in EU law as well as in the law of the United States, often allow affected 
domestic industries to seek relief against the violation of WTO rules by other 
States. A famous example is Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, which 
enables US enterprises to claim governmental action in response to foreign trade 
measures.
85
   
This is a dilemma for two reasons; first relief, in this case, is provided by a capable member 
state to its own enterprises to redress for the continued violations of WTO commitments. 
Second, without direct effect being stipulated in WTO law, and supported by the organization, 
developing and least-developing members will not be able to independently provide direct 
effect. Multinational corporations operating in member states will always take advantage of the 
limited effect of WTO law. Although free trade is legally guaranteed, national courts and 
authorities are often constrained by capacity and financial limitations; furthermore, national 
constituencies cannot challenge WTO rules, and multinational corporations work with limited 
or no scrutiny, i.e. impunity.
86
 Thus, contrary to the argument that WTO law is not ‘politically 
ready’ for direct effect, if the WTO aims to achieve an effective interactional law that is 
supportive of its obligations, as envisioned in its law, then it should facilitate the interplay 
between WTO and domestic law.
87
  
Furthermore, the argument that allowing direct effect represents a danger to democracy, as it 
might conflict with the legitimate will of the legislatures, is unsubstantiated.
88
 Democracies 
with monist legal systems that allow for the direct applicability of international laws are 
unharmed by the monist effect; rather this applicability in fact strengthens national laws and 
effectively promotes consistency with international law.
89
 If the national courts and authorities 
of member states are required to observe GATT/WTO obligations (as per GATT Articles (II) 
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and (X)), then national constituencies of consumer groups and civil societies should be allowed 
to have a seat at the WTO and challenge the legality of these obligations holding their 
governments and traders accountable to them.
90
 The argument that because of their democratic 
institutions for accountability, member states’ prefer to adjudicate in the WTO in order to 
appear responsive to domestic interests, might be valid.
91
 However, not all WTO members are 
democratic, and governments of democratic member states typically defend traders’ interests, 
not the interests of the public at large.
92
  
The lack of direct effect drives misinterpretations of WTO law and practice. National 
constituencies often view the WTO as riddled with bureaucracy, lacking in democracy, and its 
law devoid of any sense of just and fair causes, primarily because these constituencies are 
denied the opportunity to interact with and within the organization’s law and settings.
93
 Citizens 
of WTO members states should be recognised as ‘agent of justice (...) democratic principles 
[and] economic actors’ and afforded the right to challenge the legality of WTO rules and seek 
redress for their violations.
94
 It is essential to cultivate belief in the justice of WTO law for the 
sake of the legal legitimacy and democratic governance of the WTO mission, and the intended 
influence of this mission on improving member states governance of trade regulations.
95
 
Furthermore, the lack of direct effect can be linked to the controversial issue of lack of 
monetary penalties for violating WTO commitments.  
If direct effect is legally guaranteed by allowing the affected stakeholders in WTO law to seek 
redress, then offending governments and corporations would be compelled to pay reparations, 
effectively remedying their WTO violations, and, more importantly, resolving dispute(s) early. 
The need for monetary remedies will become less pertinent if official disputes are resolved in 
a timely manner, and WTO law facilitates effective ongoing interactions on the basis of 
legality, by permitting direct effect of GATT/WTO provisions. Returning to Herdegen’s 
argument that the lack of direct effect is affecting the pull to compliance with WTO obligations, 
it should be emphasised that interactional law depends on the actors’ ability to communicate 
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and understand legal norms. Enforcement of WTO commitments should not occur only in the 
DSB, but in every setting, for both state and non-state actors’ interactions.
96
 Thus, if, as in the 
case of the WTO, rules are made operative in limited instances and settings, then interactional 
law will cease to exist, and the practice of legality will be frustrated. Frustration of this practice 
is an issue relevant to the challenges faced by the developing and least-developed member 
states (i.e. developing members) when seeking to comprehend and enact legality.  
The active participation of developing members (who form the majority of WTO membership) 
in the system largely depends on WTO exemptions, and the assistance provided by the 
Committee on Trade and Development and the WTO Secretariat. However, despite the widely 
held view that the DSB is the primary engine for making the WTO operational, the DSB is not 
assisting developing members effectively. The language of the DSU briefly requires the DSB 
and disputing parties to be considerate of developing countries’ economic vulnerability (DSU 
Article 21:7-8), and provides a poorly defined procedure to help ‘least-developed member 
states’ who are involved in a dispute as a complainant or respondent (DSU Article 24).  
Understandably, if developing members are to effectively exercise their WTO memberships 
and reap the benefits of world trade, they would only go to the DSB as a last resort. Although 
a few developing members have been heavy users of the dispute settlement system, the majority 
have not used it (even as a third party), and the system is primarily used for settling disputes 
between developed members (as of (2010) the US and the EU, between them, have been 
complainants and respondents in (41%) of all cases).
97
 The challenges facing developing 
members in the DSB will be further explained in the sixth section of this article, since the 
reasons for proposing the establishment of IAWC include to help those members to fully 
engage in an interactive inclusive practice of legality. Following on from the point about 
effective means of remedying accession defects and maintaining legal interactions outside the 
DSB, the next section will provide an assessment of one of the overlooked WTO enforcement 
mechanisms, the TPRM.  
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5. The TPRM: A Mechanism for Interaction on WTO Law?  
The TPRM (including its governing body, the TPRB) is seldom discussed in the WTO law 
literature, as its reputation is superseded by the DSB.
98
 The brief discussion, or total neglect, of 
the important role of the TPRM is surprising, but given the textual and institutional limitations 
of the TPRB, it may deserve this peripheral role. However, the TPRM has an important history, 
as it was first introduced into the GATT in (1989), and then reviewed and annexed to the WTO 
texts. According to WTO TPRM paragraph (A), the objectives of reviewing the trade policies 
and practices of members are:  
1. Improved adherence by all members to the WTO rules, disciplines and 
commitments. 
2. Greater transparency in, and understanding of, trade policies and practices of 
members.    
3. The enabling of collective appreciation and evaluation, in the framework of the 
WTO, of individual trade policies and practices and their impact on the 
functioning of the multilateral trading system.
99
  
 
Since its inception in (1989) until (2015), the TPRB has conducted (429) reviews, covering 
(151) of the then (161) WTO members.
100
 The TPRB consists of representatives from all 
member states, who undertake the review process under the leadership of an elected 
chairperson (from the membership), and a discussant (chosen from the membership to stimulate 
debate).
101
 It has been argued that the TPRM was originally intended, under GATT, to ensure 
compliance and promote transparency.
102
 Although, according to paragraph A(i), the WTO 
TPRM is not intended to be a mechanism for enforcing obligations, its effect is ‘to ‘shame’ 
Members into compliance and to support domestic opposition to trade policy and practices 
inconsistent with WTO law’.
103
 In this sense, it has an enforcement effect, in terms of the 
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reputational cost following the outcome of the review of member’s trade policies and practices, 
especially if the member is found to be noncompliant.  
The TPRM is best regarded as an implementation peer review mechanism that performs an 
essential enforcement role complementary to the work of the WTO DSB.
104
 Nonetheless, it can 
be argued that because of its enforcement characteristics, to a limited extent the TPRM is 
sustaining an interactional world trade law. According to Qureshi and Ziegler, the reasons for 
construing the TPRM as an enforcement device include:  
The whole process of the review comprises of approbation and disapprobation in 
terms of a normative framework comprising of legal as well as economic criteria 
(…) A facet of the TPRM is that it can be “corrective”. The “corrective” process 
derives from the fact that the TPRM is an invitation for the collective membership 
of the WTO to evaluate and appreciate the respective member’s trade policies and 
practices (…) This process, albeit lacking in coercion, is disposed to having an 
impact on the course of State behaviour, even if in a given case it may not in fact 
have such an impact (…) The TPRM affects State behaviour ex ante. It is a 
“conditioning” mechanism. It inculcates at the earliest possible moment a “WTO” 
approved pattern of behaviour- both through the impregnation of the national 
policy framework by substantive WTO trade prescriptions, as well as through the 
provision of conditions, including institutional, necessary for the evolution of WTO 
approved trade policies.
105
 
Nonetheless, the TPRM is constrained by the adoption of incorrect periodicity for reviews, and 
the lack of effective and thorough reporting. The frequency of TPRB reviews depends on ‘the 
impact of individual Members on the functioning of the multilateral trading system, defined in 
terms of their share of world trade’.
106
 It is for this economic reason, in particular, that the 
TPRM had been criticised, for adopting the incorrect periodicity, and for failing in its 
objectives of assuring compliance and transparency, especially from developing countries, 
which are reviewed less frequently.
107
 According to Hoekman and Mavroidis,  
The TPRM process is arguably too infrequent to be very useful for enforcement, 
as most countries are reviewed only once every six years or more. (…) A major 
limitation of the TPRM is that WTO staff do not have a mandate to identify whether 
policies violate the WTO. Nor does the process centre on specific cases of issues 
                                             
104
 Mathias Kende, The Trade Policy Review Mechanism: A Critical Analysis (Oxford University Press 2018) 
42. See Jutta Brunnée, ‘Compliance Control’ in Geir Ulfstein and others (eds), Making Treaties Work: Human 
Rights, Environment and Arms Control (Cambridge University Press 2007) 382. 
105
 Asif Qureshi and Andreas Ziegler, International Economic Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 475-476 
citing P. Van Dijk (ed), Supervisory Mechanism in International Economic Organizations (Kluwer Law 
International 1984) 11.   
106
 The WTO Legal Texts (n 34) 380.    
107
 Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance’ (2000) 
The World Economy 527; Bown, Self-Enforcing Trade (n 5) 220.  
23 
 
that are of concern to the private sector and might become the subject of further 
negotiations or disputes.
108
  
The lack of utility for enforcement will have a significant negative effect on the intended 
objective of promoting transparency. The point about the lack of effective inclusive reporting 
was reiterated by Laird and Valdes, who highlighted that the review reports are ‘insufficiently 
analytical’, recommending ‘that they need to sharpen their focus (…) be tougher in identifying 
the cost of protection, who pays and who gains, if they are to meet their public choice 
objectives’.
109
 The shortage of exhaustive reporting is affecting the enforcement goal of the 
TPRM, because review reports are ‘not thorough enough to identify all deviant behaviour’.
110
 
The TPRB is an ideal setting in which to maintain an interactional world trade law, because of 
its objectives and enforcement effect.  
This is epitomised by the TPRB review process where, first, member states’ trade laws and 
regulations are scrutinized for conformity with WTO law, and, second, member states are 
guided by the principles of legality to uphold the primary objective of the TPRM of ensuring 
transparency and compliance. In the TPRM three stages of the procedures for review, reporting, 
and appraisal, member states are guided by, inter alia, the principles of promulgation, clarity, 
feasibility, constancy, and congruence. Third, the TPRB provides a continuous practice of 
legality pursuant to the already fostered background knowledge from the work of refining 
shared understandings and observing the legality principles. Finally, the TPRB can sustain an 
interactional world trade law by performing the task of progressive acculturation and education 
of WTO legality.
111
 The review process has the effect of helping members to acquire 
substantive knowledge, ensuring the conformity of reviewed member’s trade policies and 
practices with WTO law, and refining the legal practices of WTO members. However, for 
competent practices to take place, they need to be supported by continuous interactions on the 
basis of legality.
112
  
In brief, Qureshi and Ziegler’s recommendations should be considered for their emphasis on 
facilitating effective interactions through comprehensive communications with, and within, the 
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TPRB, and a form of domestic follow-up of the review to ensure its corrective and transparent 
features.
113
 State officials and non-states actors should be permitted to debate the review in 
order ‘to support domestic opposition to trade policy and practices inconsistent with WTO 
law’, and learn about the harmful cost of trade protectionism.
114
 The primary aim of the TPRM 
should thus be fostering WTO member states’ continuous inclusive, transparent practices of 
legality. However, the aforementioned analyses of the WTO accession process, the DSB, and 
the TPRM, have highlighted their weaknesses in effectively fulfilling their compliance 
purpose. For example, delayed-or-non-compliance that stem from textual and structural defects 
continue to hamper the DSB. Thus, the following section will consider one promising solution  
to the WTO compliance defects, the establishment of the Institute for Assessing WTO 
Commitments. 
6.  The Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments: 
The effectiveness of the WTO practice of legality depends on ensuring that the trade policies 
and practices of member states are compliant with WTO law through their active and well-
informed participation. However, the participation of developing countries in the WTO has 
been highly problematic thus far.
115
 The vast majority of WTO membership of (164) is made 
up of developing members, (newly acceding countries with vulnerable economies include 
Vanuatu and Yemen), and all (23) countries with an observing status for accession purposes 
are developing.
116
 Yet, developed members, especially the most litigious group (the QUAD: 
Canada, EU, Japan, and the US) have been very influential in WTO administration.
117
 This 
influence, which tends to be inconsiderate of developing members’ needs, runs contrary to the 
WTO principle of fair and equal treatment, and overlooks the founding legal philosophy of 
facilitating full participation within the confines of the WTO’s legal rules.
118
  
The issue of participation for the administration and enforcement of WTO law is the subject of 
an old and ongoing academic debate. For example, Pauwelyn argues that the WTO system 
needs less discipline (law) and more politics (voice) ‘participation, contestation (…) and 
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maintain and clarify, not eliminate, certain escape clauses and exit options, especially those 
tailored to consumer welfare’.
119
 However, the argument for more politics in the WTO runs 
contrary to the history of the ‘progressive legalization’ of GATT from unregulated politics to 
a legal order, does not account for the common yet unfounded justification for breaching WTO 
law based on welfaristic objectives (i.e. unregulated political expression and action), or the 
continued relegation of developing WTO members despite the existence of a legal order that 
is intended to be fair and inclusive.
120
 Additionally, according to the historical relationship 
between law and economics, ‘law and politics’ are inseparable from each other as their 
existence and strength are interdependent and essential for the creation and maintaining of an 
orderly society.
121
 However, because, individually, they are faced with political, financial, and 
legal constraints that hinder their participation, developing members have understandably 
formed alliances with other members for collective bargaining in order to influence rule-
making and enforcement.
122
 
Although forming an alliance has been instrumental in helping developing members states to 
reap the benefits of their memberships, the lack of an effective means of WTO participation 
has a detrimental effect on the practice of legality. The most challenging issue is the difficulty 
encountered by developing members when initiating an official dispute, usually against a 
developed member, that has more leverage and so is able to sustain the violation, unharmed, 
and even influence treaty interpretation in its own interests.
123
 It was a historical achievement 
for developing members to secure the inclusion of the SDT principle in the GATT, which 
afforded them preferential treatment that catered for their economic and developmental needs. 
However, the developing WTO members still face a number of barriers in terms of policy 
                                             
119
 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Transformation of World Trade’ (2005) Michigan Law Review 1. 
120
 See Eric Posner and Alan Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law (Harvard University Press 
2013). 
121
 Lon Fuller, ‘Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms—A Review of Robert L. Hale’s “Freedom 
through Law”’ (1954) Columbia Law Review 70. 
122
 Amrita Narlikar, ‘Collective Agency, Systemic Consequences: Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO’ in the 
Oxford WTO Handbook (n 109) 184. 
123
 Shaffer said that it does matter which state participates before the panel and AB because they will be 
systemically able to affect the interpretation of the WTO law for their own interests. For example, from January 
(1995) until December (2007), the US as a party or third party before the panel had the participation rate of 
(99%), and the EC had the rate of (85%). Official disputes involving challenges to the interpretations of DSU 
Articles (21-23) were between developed member states, mainly the US and EU, and involve developing 
members as complainant or third parties e.g. (US-Shrimp II (Viet Nam), DS429). See Gregory Shaffer, 
‘Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it Matters, the Barriers Posed’ in James 
Hartigan (ed), Trade Disputes and the Disputes Settlement Understanding of the WTO: An Interdisciplinary 
Assessment (Emerald Group Publishing Let 2009) 167. 
26 
 
settings, negotiation, and adjudication. For example, the Green Room meetings for policy 
settings which are open to a handful of selected developed and developing members, highlights 
the WTO’s lack of transparency, which will inhibit its intended practice of legality.
124
 
Under international law, and especially WTO law, power politics can influence the work of 
communities of practice, because of the capacity of powerful states to dominate decision-
makings, and interpretation.
125
 However, interactional world trade law limits the negative 
effects of power-politics, through the majority of actors upholding the principles of legality, 
emphasising the principle that ‘asserting control in the absence of shared understandings and a 
practice of legality is abusive’.
126
 Developed members cannot extract themselves from the 
procedural legality of the WTO regime, or avoid the normative implications of violating its 
core principle of non-discrimination.
127
 If diplomacy is to play a constructive role in enhancing 
compliance, by, for instance, naming and shaming the perpetrators of deviant behaviour, then 
it needs to be performed within structures founded on the basis of binding legal rules and 
practices.
128
 It is precisely this that is the WTO’s main challenge: building and maintaining 
sound legality for interaction between states. A number of WTO scholars have argued that the 
WTO structure is in urgent need of substantive reforms to cater for the members states changing 
political, economic, and social circumstances, and more importantly, solidify the trade rule of 
law.
129
  
Nonetheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss these reform proposals, since their 
primary focus is on the overall institutional design of the WTO, rather than the particular topic 
of compliance. However, specific proposals for enhancing compliance with WTO law, such as 
Bown’s proposal for establishing the Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments (IAWC), are 
worthy of consideration.
130
 The reasons and objectives for proposing the establishment of the 
IAWC were as follows: first, developing members faces substantial hurdles in their efforts to 
                                             
124
 VanGrasstek (n 32) 204-207. 
125
 For example, mainly the US and EC challenge the DSB legal interpretations of DSU Articles (21-23) on 
compliance, see Disputes by Agreement 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A5#> accessed 29 
December 2015.  
126
 Brunnée and Toope, ‘The Practice of Legality’ (n 11) 119 (emphasis added). 
127
 Brunnée and Toope, An Interactional Account (n 2) 85. 
128
 See John Jackson, ‘Editorial Comment: International Law Status of WTO DS Reports: Obligation to Comply 
or Option to “Buy Out”?’ (2004) American Journal of International Law 109. 
129
 See Paul Blustein, Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations: Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambition, and the 
Great Shambles of the World Trading System (Public Affairs 2009); Wilkinson, (n 115). 
130
 Bown, Self-Enforcing Trade (n 5) 208-237. 
27 
 
demonstrate compliance with the ‘trade rule of law’ when trying to self-enforce their rights by 
liberating their economies, secure effective access to foreign markets (i.e. compliance with 
rules), and challenge developed members in the DSB (i.e. compliance with rulings).
131
 To 
highlight the difference between compliance with ‘rules’ and ‘rulings’, and the economic 
importance of securing the former, Bown and Hoekman developed a workable chart of what 
they call, ‘the Six Steps of the WTO Extended Litigation Process (ELP)’.
132
  
The chart has three phases; phase one is the Prelitigation, consisting of the first three steps: 1. 
Identify the foreign WTO-inconsistent policy, 2. Estimate the economic benefits of removing 
the WTO-inconsistent policy, 3. Convince the domestic government to pursue the case at the 
WTO).
133
 Phase two, the Litigation includes: 4. Develop and prosecute the legal case (including 
legal briefs and economic evidence) in Geneva; and 5. Calculate the WTO-sanctioned 
economic retaliation threats for arbitration.
134
 Finally, phase three, the Post-litigation, has the 
fifth step on calculation of sanctions, and step 6. Generate public and political foreign support 
for policy removal).
135
 The most critical step in this ELP, especially for exporting firms in 
developing members, is step (1) identifying the foreign WTO-inconsistent policy.  
The second reason Bown rightly argues is that there should be a focus on ‘ways to increase 
information generation in support of exporting firms that themselves lack adequate knowledge 
of the economic, legal, and political causes of a WTO-inconsistent loss of foreign market 
access’.
136
 Bown explains that failure to provide such information will lead to firms being 
‘unable to initiate the ELP or to organize affected firms in their own country, let alone organize 
exporting firms in other countries over the same foreign market access issue. The result is the 
inability to self-enforce foreign market access’.
137
 Moreover, the Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law (ACWL), which was established in 2001 to help developing members improve their legal 
capacity, is constrained by its mandate, which is limited to step (4) of the ELP, i.e. litigation. 
Bown states that, because of this limit ‘ACWL itself cannot fill the gap of generating step 1 
information on potential disputes for developing countries to pursue’, and, hence, there is a 
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need for an entity ‘to increase public support of the step 1 information generation process’.
138
 
Similarly, because of its limited mandate, the TPRM also cannot help exporters engage in step 
(1) of the ELP.
139
   
The third reason is the lack of efforts in the WTO ‘to increase transparency, information 
generation, and monitoring’ for the purpose of helping exporting firms in developing 
members.
140
 Expanding on this point, Bown explains that developed countries are having active 
memberships in the WTO because they provide ‘information on foreign market access 
violations to their exporters’.
141
 Finally, Bown states that the above reasons ‘culminate with a 
proposal to establish a new institution- the Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments- with 
the mandate, resources, and capacity to provide the information generation services that 
developing countries require to self-enforce their foreign market access’.
142
 Bown goes on to 
explain the basic mandate of this institute, as follows:  
The fundamental purpose of the IAWC is to provide a continually updated database 
of current WTO violations, with special focus on violations of potential interest to 
exporters in developing countries (…) The purpose and mandate of the IAWC is to 
reduce the informational costs associated with getting exporting firms and 
policymakers in developing countries (and those interested in assisting them) over 
the hurdles to triggering potential use of the ELP [i.e. 1. Identify the foreign WTO-
inconsistent policy, and 2. Estimate the economic benefits of removing the WTO-
inconsistent policy]’.
143
  
 
Although the problem of inadequate surveillance and monitoring in the WTO remains a 
hindrance to effective participation, Bown was correct in noting that any proposal to solve this 
issue should not jeopardise the WTO administration benefits of negotiation, adjudication, and 
providing a forum for amicable informal resolution of disputes.
144
 Nevertheless, the WTO falls 
short of providing effective surveillance, and detailed information for ‘exporting firms and 
their advocates in potential self-enforcement actions’ to fulfil the requirements of step (1) of 
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the ELP.
145
 In this regard, there have been successful initiatives from ‘the extra-WTO 
community’ of NGOs, such as the Global Subsidies Initiative, and the Global Antidumping 
Database, to bring increased transparency to WTO members use of trade-distorting subsidies 
or anti-dumping measures.
146
 Although the data of these initiatives can be useful to exporting 
firms in developing countries seeking to self-enforce foreign market access rights, this help is 
limited because of the WTO’s weakness in monitoring its own procedure of allowing members 
to self-report subsidies or anti-dumping measures, which have been found to be inaccurate.
147
  
Finally, Bown emphasises that the IAWC must be politically independent, relying for funding 
on ‘private foundations [and] larger-budget NGOs’, have ‘a governance structure that ensures 
transparency and accountability’, and be staffed by economists, lawyers, and experts in 
political science’ that can supply the technical knowledge required to engage in the ELP.
148
 
Additionally, the IAWC should adopt a strict non-discrimination policy in its work, with Bown 
emphasising that ‘no country’s WTO violations are off limits for identification and 
dissemination’.
149
 Bown concludes the chapter on ‘Monitoring and the IAWC’, by elaborating 
on the important term of ‘trade self-enforcement’:  
The biggest benefit from additional monitoring and transparency may be a long-
run reduction in the need for actual enforcement actions. Increased availability of 
information about WTO violations will improve the likelihood that the violations 
will stop before countries have to resort to the ELP (…) Over time, enhancing 
developing countries’ access to the ELP will further enhance the reputation of their 
ability to self-enforce. This may also result in a feedback effect, encouraging 
government policymakers among all WTO members, to refrain at the start from 
imposing policies that violate WTO rules.
150
  
 
A number of reflections follow from the above summary of the IAWC proposal. At its core, 
the WTO is a political institution, and even some of its official disputes, especially the high 
profile ones, that were handled by the quasi-judicial DSB, were politically motivated, i.e. ‘tit-
for-tat’ complaints.
151
 This partly explains the self-enforcement nature of WTO law, as its law-
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subjects are afforded ‘transparent means for participation’, or self-pursuit of costly 
enforcement action under the DSB.  
However, as demonstrated by Bown and Hoekman’s ELP chart, the reality is that the lack of 
effective transparency will ultimately affect the coercive enforcement mechanism, i.e. the DSB. 
Thus, the WTO should expand its mission to provide an effective means for public participation 
and surveillance by undertaking textual and structural reforms in order to be able to cater for 
the changing political, economic, and legal circumstances of members. However, Bown’s note 
about the inherent difficulty of redesigning the WTO to enhance surveillance is reflected in 
Fuller’s point regarding achieving the right balance between ‘norms of aspiration’ and ‘norms 
of duty’ in institutional design.
152
 This point was supported by Jackson, who wrote about the 
danger of having trade agreements that upset the balance between the two kinds of norms at 
the expense of effective performance.
153
 However, the WTO cannot fulfil its mission without 
tackling the compliance-related issues that emanate from textual and structural defects and lack 
of continuous transparent legal practices.  
It can thus be said that the WTO is not fully upholding the trade rule of law aspect of 
‘compliance with rules’, because there is a lack of ‘shared understandings on compliance’ with 
WTO law. This is demonstrated by the non-discrimination principle, which is continually 
breached (GATT Articles I and III are by far the most cited articles in the (555) WTO disputes), 
and undermined by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements that are not subject to 
effective legal scrutiny by the WTO.
154
 Hence, the principles of legality required for effective 
adherence to the WTO law will always be difficult to satisfy. Furthermore, the above summary 
of the IAWC highlights the multifaceted practice of legality that includes the extra-WTO 
community of exporting firms. It appears (with the exception of some corporations that have 
drafted various world trade law instruments), that the law is not designed to cater to every 
exporting firm’s interests.
155
 Overall, the weaknesses of the TRPM and DSB, which in turn 
affect transparency and enforcement, are affecting the WTO practice of legality. Thus, the 
IAWC proposal is relevant for effective self-enforcement of WTO law.  
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7.  Conclusion  
It can be seen that the WTO is tasked with making and sustaining interactional law that has a 
historical origin in trade law. Practices that conform with the principles of legality play an 
essential role in maintaining interactional world trade law and promoting compliance. The view 
that understanding and performing legality should be confined to the DSB is mistaken, as it 
overlooks the critical tasks of making, refining, and practising legality outside of the DSB, 
which have a greater influence on sustaining compliance over time. The reliance of the 
accession process on political rather than legal discourse to ensure conformity with the trade 
rule of law is illustrative of the need to establish state legal practice at the time of accession. 
Accession defects must be dealt with more vigorously in the TPRB, which is concerned with 
reviewing members trade policies and practices for transparency and compliance purposes.  
To complement the WTO accession and DSB work, the TPRM should adopt a new review 
policy, reviewing, in particular, the accession documents of offending members. The 
unfortunate truth is that WTO members, developing or developed, provide inaccurate 
information in their accession commitments, notifications to the WTO, and review documents; 
therefore, it is the responsibility of the WTO community of state and non-state actors i.e. 
exporting firms, to play a constructive role in holding member states accountable to the law. 
Hence, the IAWC for information generation on potential WTO violations is a promising 
proposal for bridging the gap between transparency and enforcement, and enhancing the 
WTO’s practice of legality. In brief, the above interactionalism-based recommendations and 
the IAWC proposal should be considered for the sake of protecting and adhering to the 
founding principle of world trade law: compliance with the trade rule of law.  
 
 
